In this online section, we consider an information structure in which both article quality and author signals are continuously distributed. The structure is identical to the one presented in Leslie (2005) . This section, therefore, illustrates how the main result in the paper-that journal quality is maximized through a combination of both fees and delays when authors have heterogeneous cost preferences-carries over to the more general information structure.
An author of group t with quality signal q submits his articles to the journal for review if the expected benefit of submission is greater than the costs:
(1 − F z (z min |q))V ≥ C t .
If a group-t author with signal q prefers to submit his article, then any group-t author withq ≥ q also prefers to submit his article. This implies a group-t signal cut valueq t such that any author with q ≥q t submits.
When C t ≤ V , the cut valueq t solves 1 − F z (z min |q t ) = C t V .
If C t > V , thenq t → ∞, and no author from group-t submits.
We can now formalize the refereeing burden and journal size constraints. The journal must maintain an acceptable refereeing burden, meaning that the total mass of submitted articles cannot exceed τ . Therefore,
The editor must also maintain a fixed journal size, n. Since the journal editor always prefers to accept the n highest-quality submissions, she chooses z min such that
The editor's objective is to maximize the average quality of published articles subject to these constraints.
Average quality of published articles is given by
Let M * and T * define the editor's equilibrium choice of fee and delay. That is, M * and T * maximize journal quality. Proposition 1 shows that the result from the main body of the paper continues to hold.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium of the continuous-quality game, M * > 0 and T * > 0.
Journal quality is maximized through a combination of positive fee and positive delay. Relying only on a fee or only on a delay to discourage low-probability submissions does not maximize journal quality.
To establish this result, we rule out the possibility that M * > 0 = T * in equilibrium. A symmetric analysis rules out the case where M * = 0 < T * . The case where M * = T * = 0 does not satisfy the refereeing burden constraint. Thereby, we conclude that both M * > 0 and T * > 0 in equilibrium.
If τ < ρ ∅ + ρ T , then the editor cannot maintain an acceptable refereeing burden through the use of fees alone. Setting very high fees to discourage all submissions from group M T and M authors will still result in submissions from mass ρ ∅ + ρ T of the author population. In this case, the editor cannot rely only on fees and it must be that T * > 0 in equilibrium. If, on the other hand, τ > ρ ∅ + ρ T , then the editor can maintain an acceptable referee burden through the use of fees alone. For this case, we establish that the editor prefers positive delay in equilibrium.
Consider two equations for M as a function of T . One equation, M RB , represents the acceptable refereeing burden constraint; for any value of T , it gives the corresponding minimum value of M that maintains an acceptable refereeing burden. The second equation, M IC , represents the indifference curve that goes through the point where the editor maintains an acceptable refereeing burden through the use of fee alone (no time delay); for any value T , it gives the corresponding value of M that maintains the same journal quality.
Graphically, these functions are depicted in Figure 1 .
Figure 1: Indifference Curves and Refereeing Burden Constraint
The figure is drawn under the implicit assumption that ρ M = ρ T ; in the symmetric problem, the editor is indifferent between only relying on fees or only relying on delays to maintain the acceptable refereeing burden. If ρ M = ρ T , this will not be the case, and a single indifference curve will not intercept both axes at the same points as the refereeing burden constraint. This symmetry is not required for the analysis, as we will compare the slope of M IC and M RB at the point where M IC = M RB > 0 and T = 0. The analysis will rule out the possibility that M * > 0 = T * in equilibrium. A symmetric analysis may be conducted to rule out M * = 0 < T * using whichever indifference curve intercepts the T axis at the same point as the acceptable refereeing burden constraint.
Notice that journal quality is higher the closer an indifference curve is to the origin on the graph. That is, in the absence of the acceptable refereeing burden constraint, journal quality is strictly higher when the costs of submission are lower. This is because lower submission costs result in lowerq t for the groups affected by the costs, and therefore result in more submissions. Even though the average quality of total submissions decreases asq t decreases, the average quality of the n best submissions increases. Therefore, journal quality increases as either M or T decrease.
This means that the editor will always set costs such that the acceptable refereeing burden holds with equality. That is, the equilibrium choice of M * and T * will be such that M * = M RB (T * ).
To rule out an equilibrium in which M * > 0 and T * = 0, it is sufficient to show that
Because both M RB and M IC are strictly decreasing in T , this condition means that at T = 0, the slope of the indifference curve is nearer 0 (i.e., flatter) than the slope of the refereeing burden constraint. When this condition is met, starting from T = 0 and M = M RB (0), if the editor marginally increases T and decreases M while maintaining the same acceptable refereeing burden, then the new cost combination falls inside of the M IC curve. That is, the new M, T combination lies on a higher-payoff indifference curve, and results in higher journal quality than the original M > 0 = T combination.
We rewrite the acceptable refereeing burden constraint to hold with equality as a function of M RB (T ) and T :
The derivative with respect to T is
Solving Eq. 2 for
Note that
∂T > 0, and
∂T . Thus,
Evaluated at M > 0 and T = 0, this equation simplifies further. As T = 0, cut valueq T → −∞ and thus
Next, consider the indifference curve which goes through T = 0 and M = M RB (0). Suppose that average quality of published articles through this point is Z. Therefore, M IC (T ) solves
f z (z|q)zdzdq = Z.
The derivative with respect to T is 
